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INSURANCE: STATE REGULATORY LEGISLATION
BARS REGULATION BY FTC
Federal Trade Commission v. The .4merican Hospital & Life
Insurance Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958)
As a result of hearings before the Federal Trade Commission, the
respondent insurance companies had been ordered to cease and desist
from distributing allegedly misleading advertising materials.1 Both com-
panies appealed from these orders in the appropriate appellate courts? and
it was held in -both cases that under the terms of the M'cCarran-Ferguson
Act3 the FTC lacked jurisdiction since the states involved had their own
regulatory legislation. The FTC obtained certiorari4 in both cases and
they were combined before the Supreme Court where the decisions of
the courts of appeals were affirmed.'
The advertising materials complained of were shipped in bulk by
the companies to their agents who distributed them locally.' The Su-
preme Court pointed out that the case did not raise the question of the
constitutional infirmity of the states to regulate across state lines.7 Thus,
the court regarded the only "distribution" involved to be the local dis-
tribution by the agents, and construed the order of the FTC as being
directed against distribution within a state; if the state had regulatory
legislation, the order of the FTC would be invalid because of lack of
jurisdiction.'
Since the decision in the instant case turned upon an interpretation
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, some study of the background of this
legislation is necessary.
1 The American Hospital and Life Insurance Co., 21 Fed. Reg. 2979 (1956);
National Casualty Co., 21 Fed. Reg. 3924- (1956).
2 National Casualty Co. v. FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. granted,
355 U.S. 867 (1957): American Hospital and Life Insurance Co., 243 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1957); cert. granted, 355 U.S. 867 (1957).
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952).
4 Supra note 2.
5 FTC v. The American Hospital & Life Insurance Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
6 While some of the advertising complained of was distributed through
the mails directly to potential customers, most of the material was shipped in
bulk to agents who distributed it locally. The Supreme Court, however, confined
its consideration to the latter material, dismissing the former as an "insubstantial
amount".
7 "Whatever may have been the intent of Congress with respect to inter-
state insurance practices which the states cannot for constitutional reasons regulate
effectively, that intent is irrelevant in the cases before us." 357 U.S. at 564.
8 "These orders seek to proscribe activities within the boundaries of states
that have their own statutes prohibiting unfair and deceptive insurance practices
as well as within states that do not." Id. at 562; "An examination of that statute
[McCarran-Ferguson Act] and its legislative history establishes that the act
withdrew from the Federal Trade Commission the authority to regulate respon-
dents' advertising practices in those states which are regulating these practices
under their own laws." Id. at 563.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The rule that insurance was not commerce had been followed in an
unbroken line of cases since first announced by the Supreme Court in
Paul v. Virginia9 in 1868. Therefore, it came as a considerable surprise
to those interested in the "business of insurance" when the court held,
in the South-Eastern Underwriters case, that insurance was commerce;
when conducted across state lines it was interstate commerce and, as such,
subject to federal antitrust laws.1" The court distinguished its earlier
holdings by pointing out that previous litigation had never tested the
power of Congress under the commerce clause, but rather tested the
validity of state action.1 1 Protest by insurance executives and state in-
surance officials followed swiftly in the wake of the decision.' 2 Con-
gressional reaction came in the McCarran-Ferguson Act which became
law on March 9, 1945. While the legislative history of the act'" reveals
that some members of Congress wished to nullify the South-Eastern
decision and exclude all federal regulation of insurance, even a cursory
reading of the act reveals that Congress did not place the business of
insurance beyond its reach.' 4
Insurance executives were placed in a genuine quandary by the
South-Eastern decision. State tax laws and state regulations, in view of
the holding that insurance was commerce, might well be declared to be
unconstitutional burdens on interstate commerce. State revenues, of
which taxes on insurance companies were an important component, were
in danger. Accordingly, one of the main purposes of the act was to
give legal sanction to these state laws, and prevent the collapse of existing
insurance regulation.1
5
In essence, the McCarran-Ferguson Act was a call to action to the
states. The act provided:
1. For a stated period federal regulatory legislation would
9 "Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce." Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868). "The business of insurance is
not commerce. The contract of insurance is not an instrumentality of commerce."
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895).
10 "No commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across
state lines has been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress
under the Commerce Clause. We cannot make an exception of the business of
insurance." U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944).
11,"But past decisions of this Court emphasize that legal formulae devised
to uphold state power cannot uncritically be accepted as trustworthy guides to
determine Congressional power under the Commerce Clause." Id. at 545.
12In fact, several bills were introduced in Congress prior to the decision
in South-Eastern which would have made the question in the case moot by
specifically exempting insurance from the operation of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. See S. 1362, H.R. 3270, H.R. 3269, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
13 See, e.g., 91 CONG. Rec. 1085-1094 (1945).
14 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1952).
15 SEN. RaP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
1959]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
not apply to the business of insurance. 16
2. At the end of the period it would again apply except to the
areas in which there was state regulatory legislation.'"
3. To the extent that the business of insurance went un-
regulated by the state, the Federal Trade Commission Act
would apply.' 8
Therefore, it became necessary for the states to enact legislation
which covered the fields of the federal legislation. It was not necessary
that state statutes embody the same criteria as the federal laws. As
Senator Ferguson's remarks made clear, 19 the state law would control
even if in conflict with federal legislation. Thus, in the reverse of the
usual preemption concept, the states were given Congressional authority
to preempt certain areas of interstate commerce regulation.
In their attempt to justify their jurisdiction to regulate in the instant
cases, the FTC, relying on the reservation of power to them contained
in the act,2" maintained that regulate meant more than legislate; and
that if a state was not regulating administratively the mere presence of
regulatory legislation on its statute books did not prevent the FTC from
regulating. The court said this argument was not persuasive in these
cases.
2 1
The second main branch of the FTC argument was based on the
idea that individual states cannot regulate completely because of their
limited territorial jurisdiction. This argument, as noted previously22 was
dismissed by the Court as irrelevant.
The question then, of a state's ability to regulate an unlicensed out-
of-state insurer, is still an open one. The "constitutional infirmity" of
the states to reach beyond their own jurisdiction would seem to make at
least this one area subject to the control of the FTC under the terms of
the proviso in Section 1012(b). Nevertheless, even here the states are
taking measures to assert their own control.
One of the means used is the "Unauthorized Insurance Service of
Process Act" which is now law in forty-two states and two territories.
2 3
16 15 U.S.C. § 1013(a) (1952).
1715 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1952).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1952).
19 "Under the language which is now in the bill as it appears in the con-
ference report, if a state passes an act regulating insurance or taxing insurance,
and that regulation is contrary to the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act [or
Federal Trade Commission Act], then the State law would be the law." 91
CONG. REC. 1481 (1945) (remarks of Senator Ferguson).
20 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1952).
21,"However, assuming there is some difference in the McCarran-Ferguson
Act between 'legislation' and 'regulation', nothing in the language of that act or
its legislative history supports the distinctions drawn by petitioner" 357 U.S.
at 364.
22 Supra note 7.
23 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 1958 Proc. Vol. II 328.
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This act, which operates much like the non-resident motorists statutes,
provides that insurance activity within a state by an unlicensed insurer
authorizes a designated state official to accept service of process for the
insurer. While this law enables state courts to assert jurisdiction in a
properly brought litigation, it does not provide for any administrative
jurisdiction by the state insurance department.
A law to remedy this situation, and one which goes far to cure
the "constitutional infirmity", is now in force in seventeen states and the
Territory of Hawaii. This legislation permits the insurance department
of a state in which an insurance company is licensed to take administrative
action against one of its licensed companies if it is doing business in a
state in which it is unlicensed.2"
While the State of Ohio has not enacted this statute, it has adopted
all of the "Model Acts"2 5 which have been prepared by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners.2 6 Like her sister states, Ohio
has not yet found any formal means of regulating advertising activities
in Ohio conducted from outside the state by an unlicensed insurer.
27
24This legislation is of two types. One is a reciprocal statute and is opera-
tive only between states which have passed the reciprocal statute. Examples of
this type are UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-7-13 (1953), VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-433
(1950). The other type permits the superintendent of insurance to take action
against any licensed company when it is brought to his attention that the com-
pany is doing business in a state in which it is unlicensed. See ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 736.645 (1958).
25 The State Fair Trade Practice Act, OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3901.19-.23 (1955);
The Unauthorized Insurance Service of Process Act, OHIo REV. CODE § 3901.17
(1955); The Uniform Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions Law, OHIO REv.
CODE §§ 3923.01-.99 (1956).26 These acts were prepared by the Association in an attempt to cover the
fields left open to the states by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The declaration
of purpose of the State Fair Trade Practices Act, for example, says, "The
purpose of this Act is to regulate trade practices in the business of insurance
in accordance with the intent of Congress as expressed in the Act of Congress
of March 9, 1945". NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 1947
Proc. 392-400.
27 Nevertheless, Ohio uses some very effective informal means to control
this situation. Among these might be mentioned the news release and personal
communication by the Ohio Superintendent of Insurance with the like official in
the home state of the offending insurer. Briefly, this is the operation:
a. news release: When it is brought to the attention of the department that
an unlicensed insurer is soliciting business within Ohio, a news release is issued
to radio and television stations and to newspapers within the area affected. In
the release it is pointed out that X company is not licensed in Ohio and that the
protection of Ohio insurance laws is not afforded to policyholders of the com-
pany. This generally has the effect of ending the campaign.
b. personal communication: When it appears to the Superintendent that the
news release procedure is not, or is not likely to be effective, he will communicate
directly with the commissioner of insurance of the home state of the offending
company. This officer will then inform the company of the complaint which he
has received from the Ohio Insurance Department and request that they cease
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A general advertising statute2" does give a large measure of control over
advertising other than direct mail from another state.
It will be seen therefore, that the states have made strong efforts
to keep the regulation of insurance in their own hands and to exclude
federal regulation from the field. Through the widespread adoption of
the reciprocity statute they may very well succeed. On the other hand,
so long as the FTC maintains there is an area beyond which the states
cannot constitutionally reach, it can be expected that the Commission
will continue to assert its own jurisdistion in that area. The position of
the FTC is best stated by a portion of its brief in the instant case.
Quoting extensively from the South-Eastern decision they said:
To the extent therefore, that the individual states, with their
limited territorial jurisdictions [were] not fully capable of
governing 'insurance' transactions which, reaching across state
boundaries, affect the people of more states than one, that
condition necessarily continued after enactment of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The result, in the absence of
federal legislation to fill the void is a legal vacuum-a 'no
man's land' which is not effectively regulated either by the
states or the federal government.I9
Irwin F. W/oodland
the offending activity. This too, is very effective. Personal interview, Ohio
Superintendent of Insurance, Nov. 7, 1958.
28 Hio REV. CODE § 3905.43 (1953). "No person . . . shall publish or
distribute or receive and print for publication or distribution any advertising
matter in which insurance business is solicited unless such advertiser has complied
with the law of this state regulating the business of insurance .... " Only recently,
under this statute, a well known national weekly magazine was persuaded to drop
as an advertiser an insurance company that was unlicensed in Ohio. While the
Superintendent recognized that he could do nothing about copies of magazines
which were mailed directly to subscribers in Ohio, he pointed out to the magazine
that he had the authority to move against all local distribution by wholesale news
operators in Ohio. Personal interview, Superintendent of Insurance, Nov. 7, 1958.
29 Brief for Federal Trade Commission, pp. 42, 43.
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